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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the district court's denial of motion filed by the Board of 
Commissioners for Boise County, et aI., !o dismiss Gordon Ravenscroft's Petition for Judicial 
Review of Ravenscroft's termination from employment based upon lack of jurisdiction. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
On May 11, 2011, Gordon Ravenscroft ("Ravenscroft" or "Petitioner") filed a Petition for 
Judicial Review ("Petition") against the Board of Commissioners for Boise County and other named 
Respondents ("Board" or "Respondents"). R. 3. The Petition sought review of a final decision by 
the Board for Boise County, terminating Petitioner's employment, effective April 12,2011. The 
Petition claimed Ravenscroft was denied his constitutional right to due process, in excess of the 
Board's authority, and that the termination was "arbitrary, capricious, and/or an abuse of discretion." 
R.4. It was filed "pursuant to Idaho Code § 31-1506(1), IDAPA Rules; Idaho Code §§ 67-5271(3), 
67-5277,67-5279; IRCP § 84(a)(I) and Boise County Personnel Policy Manual, Resolution # 2003-
01 .... " R. 4. The Petition named the Board, the individuals who make up the Board, a deputy 
prosecutor and ten (10) unnamed Respondents. Ravenscroft requested that he be reinstated to his 
employment. R. 11. 
On May 27, 2011, the Board filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the district court was 
without jurisdiction to hear an appeal of a county personnel determination. Both sides submitted 
briefing and oral argument was held. Written and oral arguments centered around Idaho Code § 31-
1506(1); Gibson v. Ada County Sheriff's Department, 139 Idaho 5, 72 P.3d 845 (2003); Gibson v. 
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Ada County, 142 Idaho 746, 133 P.3d 1211 (2006); Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84(a)(I); and the 
Idaho Administrative Procedures Act. 
Ultimately the district court determined that the Board's decision to temlinate Ravenscroft 
was an "action" which pursuant to Idaho Code § 31-1506( 1) and case law conferred jurisdiction 
upon the court. R.43. 
The Board sought permission to appeal this decision, which was granted by the district court. 
The Supreme Court further granted the Respondents-Appellants' Motion for Permission to Appeal. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Ravenscroft is a former employee of Boise County. R 4. On or about February 28, 
2011, Ravenscroft received a Notice of Proposed Personnel Action-Termination and Notice of 
Suspension with Pay Pending Decision. R. 4. After a hearing before the county commissioners, 
a Notice of Dedsion Regarding Personnel Action Termination of Employment was issued and 
received by Ravenscroft on April 29, 2011. R. 8. On May 11,2011, Ravenscroft filed a 
PetWon for Judicial Review. The Petition prayed for an order setting aside the termination and 
demanded that the matter be remanded to the Board of Commissioners for reinstatement of 
Petitioner's employment. R. I 1. 
In its Memorandum Decision and Order ("District Court Decision"), dated September 
13, 2011, the court recognized that a county board of commissioners is not an "agency" for the 
purposes of the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act ("IAPA"), citing Idaho Code § 67-5201(1). 
R. 40. The court identified that "absent a statute invoking the IAPA's judicial review provisions, 
[the Board's] action may not be reviewed under the JAPA", citing, in addition to Idaho Code § 
67-5201 (1), the Supreme Court case of Gibson v. Ada County Sheriff's Department, 139 Idaho 
5, 72 P.3d 845 (2003) ("Gibson I"). R.40-41. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT - P. 2 
that: 
The court considered the language of Gibson I wherein the Supreme Court stated in dicta 
Notably, had Gibson appealed the county personnel hearing officer's decision to the 
Ada County Board of Commissioners (board), the board's decision would be an 
appropriate subject for judicial review and the lAP A standard of review would 
apply. I.c. § 31-1506(1). 
Gibson I, 139 Idaho at 8. R.42. 
After Gibson I, the court noted that Gibson indeed sought to appeal the hearing officer's 
decision to the board which refused to hear the decision. Armed with the refusal, Gibson then 
petitioned the district court to review the board's refusal to act. The district court denied the 
petition and Gibson appealed, arguing that Idaho Code § 31-1506( 1) conferred jurisdiction. 
The court also considered Gibson v. Ada County, 142 Idaho 746, 133 P.3d 1211 (2006) 
("Gibson If'). The court determined that the Supreme Court held that Idaho Code § 31-1506( 1) 
did not apply "because the statute expressly applied to board 'actions', not inactions." Gibson v. 
Ada County, 142 Idaho at 757, 133 P.3d at 1222. R. 43. The district court focused on the 
specific language contained in Gibson I that: 
The Court's language [in Gibson I] was not a mandate for the district court to 
review the sheriff's decision. The Court ruled that LR.C.P. 84 required a statute 
exist that provided authority for judicial review. This Court in no way indicated it 
could provide an alternate means for the district court to review the officer's 
decision in this situation. Furthermore, even if this Court attempted to provide 
such authorization, it would not satisfy LR.C.P. 
/d. R.43. 
The district court, after considering Gibson I and Gibson II as well as Idaho Code § 31-
1506( I), stated: 
In this case, however, the petItIOn seeks judicial review of the Board's own 
decision to terminate Ravcnscroft. The petition does not seek judicial review of the 
Board's review, or refusal of review, of personnel decisions of other elected county 
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officers. As such, there is a board of county commissioners "action". Gibson I and 
Gibson II indicate that Idaho Code § 31-1506( 1) would thus confer jurisdiction. 
District Court Decision, p.5, R. 43. 
D. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In reviewing the decision of a lower court ruling on a Motion to Dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction, "[T]he question then is whether the non-movant has alleged sufficient facts in 
support of his claim which, if true, would entitle him to relief." Rincover v. State, 128 Idaho 
653,656,917 P.2d 1293, 1296 (1996). The appellate court exercises free review over a district 
court's conclusions of law. Maresh v. State, Dept. of Health & Welfare ex ref. Caballero, 132 
Idaho 221, 224, 970 P .2d 14, 17 (1998). 
II. 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Has the district court correctly determined that case law and Idaho Code § 3 1-1506( 1) 
give the judiciary jurisdiction to review a board of county commissioner's decision to terminate 
county personnel under chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code? 
III. 
ARGUMENT 
It is respectfully submitted that the Petition was improvidently brought for the reason that 
the district court had no jurisdiction to hear an appeal of a county personnel determination, and 
that the court erred by finding that it had jurisdiction to hear such an appeal. 
In examining the sole authority cited by Petitioner for his claim of jurisdiction [Petitioner 
abandoned all other theories of jurisdiction at the district court level], it is best to begin with the 
actual language of such authority. Idaho Code § 31-1506(1) reads in its entirety: 
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Unless otherwise provided by law, judicial review of any act, order or proceeding 
of the board shall be initiated by any person aggrieved thereby within the same 
time and in the same manner as provided in chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code, for 
judicial review of actions. 
I. e. § 31-1506(1). This statute falls within a chapter of the Idaho Code dealing with county 
finances and claims. The statutes within the chapter are designed to deal with vendors who 
provide receipts for amounts "justly due" 'or where "services were rendered." Idaho Code § 31-
1501. The chapter also deals with the burial of county poor, I.e. § 31-1504, and the redeeming 
of warrants, I.e. § 31-1507. Nothing is found within the chapter indicating that it applies to 
personnel decisions of a county commission. It is submitted that Idaho Code § 31-1506 does not 
confer jurisdiction. It simply sets forth the procedure for appealing the denial of a claim or 
warrant. 
The heart of this jurisdictional matter is whether the legislature intended to confer 
jurisdiction to the district court to act as an appellate body in cases involving personnel decisions 
made by county commissioners. In other words, when the legislature passed the statute in 1993, 
did it intend to say that all appeals from a board or county commission, as they are otherwise 
allowed elsewhere in Idaho Code, must be in accordance with the Idaho Administrative 
Procedure Act, or did it create jurisdiction allowing a district court to rule upon any "act, order 
or proceeding" of county commissioners, no matter how esoteric or trivial? It is respectfully 
submitted that the answer must be the former rather than the latter. This is based upon several 
reasons. These are: (I) the language of statute and its context; (2) the legislative history; (3) the 
absurdity of the result of the latter interpretation; (4) the latter interpretation would conflict with 
established principals of Idaho employment law; and, (5) the latter interpretation conflicts with 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84(a). 
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Idaho Code § 31-1506( J), on its face, does no more than overlay the IAPA on county 
commissioners' decisions relating to monetary claims and is found in the county finance chapter 
of the Idaho Code. 
Statutory interpretation begins with taking the literal words of a statute and giving the 
language its plan, obvious, and rational meaning. Wolfe v. Farm Bureau Insurance Co, 128 
Idaho 398, 913 P.2d 1168 (1996). Considering that Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84(a) states in 
pertinent part that "actions of a local government, its officers or its units are not subject to 
judicial review unless expressly authorized by statute," it is clear that Idaho Code § 31-1506 
does not accomplish that which is required by the rule. 
If, however, the section is argued to be ambiguous, then the court must look not only at 
the literal words of the statute, but also the context of those words, the public policy bchind the 
statute and its legislative history. In Re Daniel W., 145 Idaho 677,183 P.3d 765 (2008). 
The context is demonstrated by the legislative history. At the passage of House Bill 120 
in 1993, three (3) statutes regarding appellate process for county commissioners' decisions were 
repealed. Those statutes had been in effect from the 1890's and dealt with appeals by persons 
aggrieved by an order, taxpayers, notice, bond, timeliness and record keeping. These were 
denoted as then Idaho Code §§ 31-1509 through 31-1511. The statutes conflicted with the 
IAPA in that the courts could, at least in theory, substitute their judgment for that of the 
commissioners. Hence, The Idaho Association of Counties sought to repeal those sections and 
bring appellate practice into conformance with IAPA. This was made clear in the Statement of 
PUlpose, attached as "Exhibit A" to this brief. At the time of the passage of House Bill 120 in 
1993, it is significant to note that no court in Idaho at any time had stated that personnel 
decisions by county commissioners were appealable. Nothing in the legislative history to 1993 's 
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House Bill 120 implied that the legislature intended to expand appellate practice arising from 
county commissioner decision making beyond what was already in place. 
In Gibson v. Ada Coun~y Sheriff's Department, 139 Idaho 5, 72 P.3d 845 (2003), the 
Idaho Supreme Court was presented with a Petition for Judicial Review brought by a former 
county sheriffs deputy after she was terminated for misconduct. A woman was fired from the 
Ada County Sheriff's Office after it was discovered that she may have been falsifying pay 
vouchers. A hearing officer was appointed in accordance with the Ada County Code, which in 
turn was based upon ordinance. The hearing officer upheld the tennination. The Ada County 
ordinance stated in part that Gibson could appeal the decision to the district court. A Fourth 
Judicial District judge reviewed the matter and affirmed the county personnel officer's Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Gibson then appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court, which 
dismantled the underpinnings of Gibson's appeal. In so doing, the court held that the IAPA did 
not apply, that a county personnel hearing officer's actions are not subject to judicial review 
under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84, and that a county ordinance cannot authorize judicial 
revIew. 
In so ruling, the Idaho Supreme Court engaged in some gratuitous ohiter dictum - a 
judicial comment made during the course of delivering a judicial opinion, but one that was 
unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential. This judicial "by the 
way" reads as follows: 
Notably, had Gibson appealed the county personnel hearing officer's decision to 
the Ada County Board of Commissioners (board), the board's decision would be 
an appropriate subject for judicial review and the IAPA standard of review would 
apply. I.e. § 31-1506(1). Without action of the board, however, the judicial 
review provisions of 1.C. § 31-1506( 1) are inapplicable. 
Gibson, 139 Idaho at 8. 
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This language immediately caused mischief for the court. Ms. Gibson filed no fewer 
than three (3) additional cases against Ada County and its various officials which were 
ultimately consolidated by the Idaho Supreme Court in Gibson v. Ada County, 142 Idaho 746, 
133 P.3d 1211 (2006). Ms. Gibson, taking her cue from the dictum in what the court styled as 
Gibson J, brought a claim which the court styled [confusingly] as Gibson Ill. Therein, Gibson 
sought review by the Ada County Commissioners of the personnel action. The Ada County 
Commissioners declined to review the matter, and that decision was appealed to the district court 
under the guise of Idaho Code § 31-1506. The district court dismissed the appeal, which was 
then further appealed by Gibson to the Idaho Supreme Court. Gibson cited the court's own dicta 
in Gibson J as the basis for the appeal and further alleged that because the board of 
commissioners' decision was "an action," Idaho Code § 31 1506(1) applied. The coul1 was 
forced to repudiate its own dicta as follows: 
This Court's language was not a mandate for the district court to review the 
sheriffs decision. The Court ruled that I.R.C.P. 84 required a statute exist that 
provided authority for judicial review. This Court in no way indicated it could 
provide an alternate means for the district court to review the officer's decision in 
this situation. Furthermore, even if this Court attempted to provide such 
authorization, it would not satisfy I.R.C.P. 84. 
Gibson, 142 Idaho at 757. 
As to the argument that the refusal to review the hearing officer's decision by the 
commissioners was an "action" as used in Idaho Code § 31-1506( 1), the court stated: 
"This Court has free review over the construction of a statute ... which includes 
whether a statute provides for judicial review, and the standard of review to be 
applied if judicial review is available." ... Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84 
clearly states that a statute must "expressly" authorize that an action of an officer 
is subject to judicial review. Idaho Code § 31-1506(1) does not satisfy I.R.C.P. 84 
because it does not specifically authorize judicial review in this instance. 
Gibson, 142 Idaho at 757 (emphasis by the court) (citations omitted). 
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The upshot of the Gibson cases is that there is no statute expressly authorizing appeal of a 
board of commissioners' personnel decision, nor is there some free standing judicial approval of 
bringing such an appeal. 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court later engaged in f\.ll1her dicta in Giltner Dairy, LLC, v. 
Jerome County, 150 Idaho 559, 249 P.3d 358 (2011), a land use planning case. The Court noted 
that it has given "expansive reading" to Idaho Code § 31-1506, ostensibly granting the courts the 
right of review to certain county actions. What was significant was that the Supreme Court 
found that Idaho Code § 31-1506 had no application to the matter before it. 
Of the four cases cited in Giltner Dairy to support the assertion that "expansive reading" 
has been given to Idaho Code § 31-1506, three of them predate the adoption of the Idaho 
Administrative Procedures Act, having been ruled upon in 1907, 1910 and 1919. The fourth, In 
re Bennion, 97 Idaho 764, 554 P.2d 942 (1976), dealt with an appeal from a planning and zoning 
approval. However, as clearly set forth in the Local Land Use Planning Act adopted in 1975, 
"an affected person aggrieved by a decision .,. may ... seek judicial review as provided by 
chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code." Idaho Code § 67-6521. Furthermore, the only reference in the 
Bennion ease to appeals was the statement "the record discloses substantial compliance with the 
provisions of I.e. § 31-1509 et seq., which establishes the procedure on appeals of this nature." 
97 Idaho at 765. It should also be pointed out that all of these cases pre-date the 1993 revision 
ofldaho Code § 31-1506. 
Every case cited in Giltner Dairy by the court pertaining to the "expansive reading" 
phrase was one involving some level of quasi-judicial decision making (albeit that the majority 
of the cases cited by the Supreme Court predated the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act). 
Here, as will be seen below, the determination to terminate Petitioner was not of a quasi-judicial 
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nature. So it is hard to see how Giltner Dairy can be used to argue for review of personnel 
decisions at the county level. Nevertheless, the district court below found the language 
persuasIve. 
In summary, the history of these cases can be stated as follows: the court engaged in 
unnecessary language in Gibson 1, and had to retreat from that language in Gibson 11 because it 
lead down a blind alley. Now, the question is whether Giltner Dairy takes the counties back 
down that alley. 
The Idaho courts have made it clear that they will not engage in statutory interpretation 
resulting in palpable absurdity. Federated Publications, Inc., v. Idaho Business Review, Inc., 
146 Idaho 207, 192 P.3d 1031 (2008); In Re Estate of Miller, 143 Idaho 565, 149 P.3d 840 
(2006). The personnel decisions made by county commissioners are numerous. They range 
from the crafting of personnel manuals, to deeiding who might be eligible for a merit raise or 
bonus, to detennining which holidays will be granted to employees with pay, to verbal and 
written reprimands, to furlough decisions, to disciplinary decisions, to hiring decisions, etc. The 
reason that these matters should not be subject to appeal is that they are not quasi-judicial in 
nature. Even at the level of termination, as in this case, all that is due an individual is oral or 
written notice of the reasons for termination, explanation of the employer's evidence, and an 
opportunity to present the employee's side of the story. Anderson v. Spaulding, 137 Idaho 509, 
50 P.3d 1004 (2004). No witnesses are sworn, no "judge" presides, no record need be made, and 
the open meeting rules do not apply. Simply put, to graft appellate practice onto personnel 
decision making would be an absurd interpretation of Idaho Code § 31-1506. Moreover, such an 
interpretation would greatly increase the workload of the court system and leave the distriet 
eourts to fend for themselves as to the procedures and "rules of the road" in ruling upon 
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personnel "appeals." The courts would literally have to invent out of whole cloth a new form of 
appellate practice if every decision that could relate to any "act" of a county commission would 
be automatically appealable. 
Perhaps most important, such a reading would conflict with much of Idaho employment 
law, as it applies to counties. The problem is that it conflicts with the doctrine of at-will 
employment and the scope of review under such doctrine. 
In beginning an analysis of Petitioner's position, a disconnect becomes readily apparent. 
Petitioner describes his experience before the Boise County Commissioners as an "evidentiary 
hearing." R. 5. He then goes on to assert he "submitted compelling evidence" and that 
Respondents "presented no sworn testimony" and therefore failed to "carry the County's burden 
of proof." R. 26. Even assuming that Petitioner is not an at-will employee (a matter that is far 
from having been decided), the only pre-termination due process that is to be given such an 
employee is: (a) oral or written notice of the reasons for the termination; (b) an explanation of 
the employer's evidence; and (c) an opportunity to present his or her side of the story. Anderson 
v. Spaulding, 137 Idaho 509, 516, 50 P.3d 1004,1011 (2004). The Anderson court did no more 
than adopt the federal law as set forth in Cleveland Board of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 
(1985). 
This is not an idle distinction. Simply put, a county's decision to terminate an employee 
is not a quasi-judicial matter. No Idaho court, anywhere, has assigned a burden of proof to either 
a county or an employee. No Idaho court has required sworn testimony. Indeed, no Idaho court 
has even hinted to the effect that it has jurisdiction to determine whether the Board was right, 
wrong, too harsh, or whether a lesser sanction than termination would be more appropriate. 
Putting it bluntly, no Idaho court has ever suggested that name clearing hearings were appealable 
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to the district court and it is submitted that because such name clearing hearings are not quasi-
judicial, there is nothing to appeal in this case. 
Idaho has passed "right to work" legislation which declares that the public policy of the 
state of Idaho is to "maximize individual freedom of choice in pursuit of employment." Idaho 
Code § 44-200 I. Idaho appellate courts have repeatedly held that employment is at-will unless 
an employee is hired pursuant to a contract that specifies the duration of employment or limits 
the reasons for which an employee may be discharged. Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 
Idaho 233, 108 P.3d 380, 387 (Idaho 2005). "Unless an employee is hired pursuant to a contract 
which specifies the duration of the employment or limits the reasons for which an employee may 
be discharged, the employment is at the will of either party and the employer may tenninate the 
relationship at any timc for any reason without incurring liability". Metcalf v. Intermountain 
Gas Co., 116 Idaho 622, 778 P.2d 744, 746 (Idaho 1989). In Cantwell v. City of Boise, 146 
Idaho 127, 134, 191 P.3d 205 (2008), the Idaho Supreme Court determined "it is the burden of 
an employee to rebut the presumption his employment was at-will." 
In general, an employer may discharge an at-will employee at any time for any reason 
without incurring liability. Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233, 240, 108 P.3d 380, 
387 (2005). However, the right to discharge an at-will employee is limited by considerations of 
public policy, such as when the motivation for the firing contravenes public policy. A narrow 
exception to the at-will employment presumption is where the employer's motivation for the 
termination contravenes public policy. See, Ray v. Nampa School Dist. No. 131, 120 Idaho 117, 
120,814 P.2d 17,20 (1991); Mallonee v. State. 139 Idaho 615, 619, 84 P.3d 551, 555 (2004); 
and Van v. PortneufMedical Center, 147 Idaho 552, 561, 212 P.3d 982, 991 (2009). 
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In contrast, in appellate practice under Idaho Code § 67-5279(3), a court is required to set 
aside findings, conclusions, or decisions that (a) violate constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) 
exceed the statutory authority; (c) are made upon unlawful procedure; (d) are not supported by 
substantial evidence in the record; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
To graft such judicial review upon an at-will employment determination transforms the 
at-will relationship to one of rights and entitlements in all cases where a county is involved, in 
direct contravention of decades of Idaho case law. 
Finally, there is the language of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84(a). Even though raised 
by the Board, Rule 84 was not discussed by the district court below. The court found a 
difference between Gibson 1 and this case, in that Gibson 1 dealt with a firing determination by a 
hearing officer, whereas here the firing was by the commissioners. What thc court did not do is 
look at the language of Gibson 11 in the context of Rule 84. 
The Rule states in pertinent part that "[a]ctions of ... a local government ... are not 
subject to judicial review unless expressly authorized by statute." I.R.C.P. 84(a)(1). If anything 
is certain in this case, it is that Idaho Code § 31-1506 does not expressly authorize courts to act 
as de facto personnel commissioners. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
This appears to be a matter of first impression. The court has a clear choice. It can open 
the courtrooms of the state to every disgruntled employee, tax protester, officious intermeddler 
or gadfly who takes issue with any "action" of a county commission, or it can find that the 
tortured reading of the statute urged by the Petitioner is not, and never has been, the law. 
Considering that an entire body of law has already developed under prior decisions of both the 
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Unites States Supreme Court and of this court that allow for an employee to resist termination 
and clear his name, considering that such matters are not quasi-judicial, considering that the 
legislature never intended the apparent chaos that will result from the adoption of the methods 
urged by the Petitioner, and considering that allowing for an appeal will force the district courts 
to make up a new body of appellate law on the fly, the district court's determination to allow the 
appeal must be overturned. 
DA TED this )tJ day of May, 2012. 
MICHAEL KANE & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
BY: --------------~-------------
MICHAEL J. KANE 
Attorneys for Respondent-Appellant 
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STA'l'EMENT OF PURPOSE 
RS 02035 
The purpose of t;q4s ; .1:> ill is to provide for the appeal of 
. . , ~., . 
county commissioner de¢is.fu~n$ in the same manner as .. judicial ' +eview 
: . ..:. ":. :.;, ' 1.-.: .. . ;. . " }. . ," " :' .\:' ):~ . ',.. . .' • 
of actions undel; : the ~4iz1$1.¥*s~r<;ltive J;!;t:oe:edureAct (Al?Ahchapter 
52, title 67, Idaho Cpde. 
'.H :'>':. ~/ .• '. 
The current ' p;-9P,~:~~ .f.q~Al?J?ealij . is ar.~h~ic and in~on~i~tent 
. . ,' f:"':··';" ''' : " . 
. with other sectiOn$',o,;>c~'u~tY 'l~W. ;,th~ ' Pt~piiiga,~d .;d'l1~i#g a~d 
;'~:;"?~:' . . ": ," .... ;- ~ ....... . , ', ;" ;.: .; .. > .:.:", ".'.\ ," ' ;..0, . ...,:.. '" ,,~": " 
medical indigencyapp~'?i~$a,+e. C:;Qnquct:ed as .appeals under th!a APA. 
• • • -- ":;';.~" .' : '. ~ ,', ' ' __ -''- " • • ; 1 ~ 
The currentPl:9¢,~.s~hf 'app$i.£a~~· ~rr6c::ed1.i"1"~ >make:s the d~striQt 
'., .~ .... ~ .:,' . .' . . ,:' , L:; --.':'j" ;. .. \ . ", , " " .. '-
judge the fourth - or ' ; I' su~er~ ': ¥Qiiu'4l~~j[Qn.~r -with 'the ability to 
overrule the€~.6t~ii ': &~~~~,t~~t~~'~ -> ,'and judgments of ··'ti).re~ : 
indtvtdU.als . 
the APA. 
;·t "~i? ~'~,., : >' 
affected by county CQQ¥$~¢~t1cl~'f:lisi,q~swh~J.e 9~viJg< c6~s'i(i~;~ti~'~' 
:,::. " ,: .. :.;.~~,:::,": ~ ': {" /'J<' ~ ' :. :, ," : ,,' 
FISCAL NOTE 
NONE. 
. .. ; . 
. , STA:'1';~;:MEfil' OF PURPOSE/FISQAL IMPACT 
'. " . .' . , " ,- ~., i :": H 121) , 
